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THE MILITARISATION OF THE 
JAPANESE ECONOMY 
By Masao KIHARA * 
The economic development of this country after the war has been watched with 
open-eyed wonder. The average annual rate of industrial growth in this country 
after the war was 12.9% for the period 1953-1965. Conservative politicians in 
this country advance the opinion that one of the causes of such a striking rate of 
growth is ascribable to the small military defrayment due to the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S.A., and some economists 
regard the fact that there existed no military industry in this country after the 
war as one reason for such growth. 
Nevertheless it is impossible to say, though believed by so many people, that the 
Japanese economy has made peaceful progress after the war and that the structure 
of the national economy has also been of a peaceful nature. It may be true that 
the U.S. Forces made it the primary task of the military occupation to disarm and 
demilitarise this countryl), and a variety of counter-measures were carried out for 
the purpose of economic disarmament by eliminating all existing specialised 
facilities for the production of arms, munitions or war materials of any kind and by 
preventing this country from preserving any production capacity of a military 
nature2), but this original basic policy came to be changed by 180 degrees from as 
early as the beginning of 1948 in order to make this country "a defensive wall against 
communism", by making use of Japanese industrial power as "an arsenal of the 
East" . 
It was by the speech delivered by the Chief U.S. Army Administrator, Royal, 
at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on 6th January 1948 that the complete 
change of American policy toward Japan was made publicly known. Part of the 
speech runs as follows: " ... And with this increasing economic approach there has 
arisen an inevitable area of conflict between the original concept of broad demilitari-
sation and the new purpose of building a self-supporting nation. . .. The destruction 
of synthetic rubber or shipbuilding or chemical or non-ferrous metal plants will 
certainly destroy the war potential of Japan, but such destruction may also adversely 
affect the peace potential. ... But at some stage extreme deconcentration of 
industry, while further impairing the ability to make war, may at the same time 
... Professor of Economics, Kyoto University 
1) U11ited Stales Initial Posl-Surrender Policy for Japan, Sept. 22, 1945. 
2) Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and 
ContTol if Japan, Nov. I, 1945. 
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impair the manufacturing efficiency of Japanese industry-may, therefore, postpone 
the day when Japan can become self-supporting. . .. We hold to an equally definite 
purpose of building in Japan a self-sufficient democracy, strong enough and stable 
enough to support itself and at the same time to serve as a deterrent against any 
other totalitarian war threats which might hereafter arise in the Far East." 
I 
The weight of the Japanese heavy chemical industry in relation to the total 
production of her manufacturing industry, i.e., the rate of heavy chemical industriali-
sation, ranks first among all capitalist countries as shown in Table I. 
Table 1. The Weight of the Heavy Chemical Industry in Relation to the 
Whole of the Manufacturing Industry (1961) 
.. _! 
- ------: 
Japan 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
West Germany 
Italy 
68.1 
55.6 
58.4 
59.3 
58.4 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, White Paper, Introduction, 1966, p. 157. 
The economic foundation which supported Japanese militarism prior to the 
last World War was, needless to say, heavy manufacturing industry and a great 
number of financial combines were reared on the priority arising out of military 
necessity during the pre-war period. The rate of progress (according to the amount 
of added values) in the field of metal and machines in relation to the production of 
manufacturing industry as a whole may briefly be stated as follows: not more than 
10% in 1900, 34.3% in 1930, 53.4% in 1935 when the invasion of China began 
and as great as 71.6% in 1940, the very year immediately before the Pacific War 
broke out. The rapid growth rate of heavy chemical industrialisation particularly 
after 1930 was ascribable to rapid developments in the field of machinery which 
provided a direct foundation for munition production, while the relative weight of 
the ordinary machine industry was 2.6% in 1930,9.9% in 1935 and 33.2% in 1940. 
What could be the factor which facilitated heavy chemical industrialisation 
during the pre-war period? A very definite answer to this question was given by 
Mr. Uemura, Chairman of the Federation of Economic Organisations who stated: 
"The defense industries played a very important part in the past in the industrialisa-
tion ofthis country. A variety of manufacturing techniques began to be introduced 
from overseas after the Restoration of 1868 and this country consistently made rapid 
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progress in industrialisation, being partly encouraged by the Government, and no 
one can deny the fact that the national power of this country was greatly streng-
thened by the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, not to speak of the 
World War. During those war periods it was a mandatory requirement for the 
specific purpose of national defense that the defense forces should be increased and 
at the same time that ordnance should be domestically manufactured. Con-
sequently there is no room for any doubt that not merely production techniques of 
weapons were improved by the expanded arsenals of the Government itself on the 
one hand, and governmental protection and encouragement of civilian manu-
facturers on the other, but also that such circumstances made no small contribution 
to progress in the field of ordinary industry, particularly to the process of heavy 
chemical industrialisation. "3) 
Monopoly capital in this country encouraged the militarisation of the Japanese 
economy in order to reap the maximum profit during pre-war times and endeavour-
ed to reinforce militarism. As a result it is a well-known series of facts that "the 
defense forces" were turned into "aggressive forces", the armed invasion of the 
Chinese mainland was attempted and that this country became notorious throughout 
the world for her militarism. 
In the meantime, would it be reasonable to assume, as often remarked by 
those types of people who call themselves revisionists, that the characteristics of 
Japanese monopoly capital, which provided an economic foundation for her 
militarism, were altered after her defeat in the war to the effect that Japanese 
capitalism after the war happened to turn into a new capitalism of a "modified 
type", having nothing to do with the military economy which was formed "through 
the modified change of the former monopoly capitalism or classical capitalism arising 
from the military economy of the Fascist type" ?') Could it be true that the so-called 
"rapid growth" of this country after the war was accomplished, though imperfectly, 
through a "reform of Keynes type"S), the content of which was said to be composed 
of three "requisites" such as "the policy of effective demand", "the social security 
policy of the welfare nation type" and "the enforcement and introduction of 
national plans"? Again, would it be justifiable to remark that the economic 
growth of Japanese capitalism could after all have been materialised by the mere 
fact that a possible rapid increase of military expenditure was arrested by American 
control ?') According to the people mentioned the causative factors contributing 
to "rapid growth" are, in short, investment for equipment and consumer demand 
(individual consumer outgoings). Capitalists and bourgeois economists also regard 
3) K. Uemura, "The Industrial Structure of This Country", Monthly Report of the Federation of 
Economic Organisations, Vol. III, No.3, 1955, p. 5. 
4) The Present japanese Capitalism, Vol. I, p. 5. 
5) Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
6) Ibid., p. 40. 
THE MILITARISATION OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 29 
"technical innovation and revolutionalised consumption" as causative factors of 
"rapid growth". Needless to say, it is not denied that the excessive accumulation 
of capital was one of the factors of "rapid growth", but it must also be admitted 
that it was only for the purpose of gaining a special surplus value that nothing else 
was done except rushing about to introduce new techniques and making further 
investments for the purpose of "rationalisation". Moreover, the facts that the 
accumulation of capital began to be intensified, taking advantage of the "special 
procurement demand" arising from the needs of the Korean War, and that the 
resultant process of structural reorganisation of the production system to be carried 
out by monopoly capital came to take a further step forward, are very suggestive of 
the very fact that either the causative factors of "rapid growth" or its results should 
by no means be such a simple matter to be seen in rosy colours. 
It is no more possible to look upon such problems as the development of 
Japanese capitalism, the rapid progress of heavy chemical industrialisation and 
the improvement of techniques as having nothing to do with war industries 
the post-war period than it was during the pre-war period. It may be true that 
during the relative weight of munition production in the post-war Japanese 
economy is far smaller than it was in the pre-war economy, as shown in Table 2, 
but this fact by no means furnishes sufficient proof that the militarisation of the 
Japanese economy has not been effected at all, or that there is no such fear. 
Table 2. The Position of Munition Production in Relation to the 
Production of Manufacturing Industry 
A Amount of Munition Production i I 
(Unit: ¥ 1,000,000) B Amount of I Percen tage 
------ Production of Year i-- Total IDomestic Procurementl --Speciar- ! Manufacturing . AlB 
Amount from Self Defense F orcel Procurement i 
1954 78,058 24,562 I 53,496 I 6,461,925 1.2 
I 1955 74,772 42.903 31,869 7,149,489 1.0 
1956 86,591 49.857 36,734 9,193,033 0.9 
1957 108,790 57,332 51,585 10,287,840 l.l 
1958 i 101,622 73,560 28,162 9,246,400 l.l 
1959 100,185 65,968 34,217 13,231,248 0.8 
1960 115,842 79,080 36,762 16,906,809 0.7 
1961 103,462 74,075 29,387 20,299,187 0.5 
1962 127,371 101445 25,926 21,088,593 0.6 
1963 129,367 121,668 7,799 24,678,383 0.5 
1964 166,848 157,218 9,630 28,174,211 0.6 
1965 133,569 116,999 16,570 28,342,973 0.5 
1966 152,790 133,018 19,772 33,845,115 0.5 
Na/;onal D~fense Yearbook, 1968, p. 359. 
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The former National Police Reserve Force was reorganised into the National 
Ground Defence Force (Safety Force) in 1952 and it became definite war potential 
if seen from its organisation, formation, personnel strength, equipment and 
training, which is solemnly prohibited by the Japanese Constitution. Going still 
further in 1954, it was again reorganised to establish the Self Defense Force, 
undergoing a "qualitative change", when the original organisation grew into a 
"National Defense Force", the primary purpose of which was to defend the nation 
against hostile attack, the maintenance of public peace being its secondary mission 7). 
These facts illustrate the established truth that there do exist, both nominally and 
virtually, troops in Japan similar to an army in other countries-in short an army 
which should by no means exist in this country from the point of view of Clause 9 
of our Constitution. 
In the meanwhile, "as it becomes more and more important for the present day 
army to have defensive power in readiness to cope with the recent progress in 
weapon-making and changes in international relationships, so it becomes more and 
more essential to have equipment ready for immediate use. What makes it 
possible to do so is nothing but defense production capacity which can be put into 
full play at any time. However recent any type of equipment which particularly 
requires highly specialised techniques may be, it simply can not be anything if 
production in the rear is not supported by an effective production capacity in 
readiness"'). "Once the scale of the troops is determined, it is natural that their 
equipment is of necessity to be domestically manufactured"9) and "the defense 
industry is now making headway" on the pretext that defensive power without an 
industrial foundation is a mere "castle in the air">O). 
Furthermore, most monopoly capitalists and bourgeois economists advance 
the following views: that "the extreme importance of the position of war industries 
should be emphasised not only from the point of view of encouraging ordinary 
industry, but also for the reason that building up defense industries would further 
closer relationships with the improvement of the technical level in ordinary 
manufacturing industry because of the highly specialised techniques required in 
today's defense, such as aircraft and electronic weapons"!»l'): for example, ball-
bearings for military use required a precision of 99.9999, and that "national defense 
expenditure should be allowed to force its way into the national enconomy to a 
far greater extent, inconceivable in weight in comparison with those days in the past 
when production power in reserve used to play a more important part, for the 
reason of its giving a continual and effective stimulus to the specialisation of industry 
7) Chuichi Fukase, "Defensive System I: Self Defense Force", Jurist. January 1967, pp. 38-,39. 
8) "Ten Years' History of the Defensive Production Committee", Opinions with Respects to the Basic 
Policy of the Home Making of the Defensive Equipments, February 1962 published by the Federation 
of Economic Organisations. 
9), 10), II), 12) K. Uemura, The Industrial Structure qf This Count,y, p. 5. 
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and strengthening its international competitiveness, ... and that defense expenditure 
within a certain extent would rather expand the national economy13), and increase 
employment and individual income"l4). What munition production means to 
Japanese monopoly capitalists is the implication that it is of such a nature that 
such production must naturally be accepted from the higher aspect of mutual 
economic cooperation between this country and the U.S.A. as far as it serves to 
maintain peace and safety in the Far East and at the same time it is after all an 
export industry, providing that U.S. dollars may be gained therefrom"l'). There 
is so far no indication of any reflection or awakening with respect to war industries 
or our militarised national economy by monopoly capitalists or bourgeois economists. 
"Munitions are an export industry" and monopoly capitalists are none other than 
"death merchants". 
War industries, for which the demand is fixed by national military expenditure, 
the materialisation of which is guaranteed, are now steadily making headway on the 
basis of mass production of the latest munitions on a heavy chemical industrialisa-
tion foundation by acquiring the latest techniques and by establishing the latest 
production management systems as powerful potential to beat the keen competition. 
It is generally said that war indmtries do not usually pay sufficiently, but when 
orders are issued from the Defense Force Headquarters, gains ranging from 8-10% 
are approved as reasonable profit lfi ), the fact of which shows that the rate of profit 
is not too small. On what basis of cost accounting are those orders issued from the 
Self Defense Headquarters and accepted in business circles? It is not hard to 
imagine that cost accounting in such cases is being made with sufficient margins. 
Needless to say, the reliable guarantee of a fixed profit, small as it may appear, must 
be most attractive to monopoly capital under the present circumstances of keen 
competItIOn. In addition, the latest techniques acquired through military 
production would yield far greater benefits, perhaps fruits certainly well worth the 
while to cover the actual small profit. It is not a matter of mere chance that 
monopoly capital enters a desperate business fight whenever a business order is 
issued from Self Defense Headquarters. It is because the progress of monopoly 
capital and war industries are inseparably related to each other and because 
munition production is essential for them to reap the maximum profit. 
As far as this point is concerned, there is no substantial difference between the 
pre-war and post-war periods. Nevertheless, what should not be disregarded when 
13) "Ten Years' History of the Defensive Production Committee", p. 259. 
14) "Mr. K. Akamatsu's opinion at the Round-Table Talk in the Central Review, November issue~ 
1952; p. 97. Mr. Akamatsu made a further commitment on the same page that, should inflation 
be brought about by the increase of military expenditureJ "it might as well be invested in war 
industries through a savjngs campaign." 
15) "Ten Years' History of the Defensive Production Committee", p. 49. 
16) Keizai Shunju, April 1966, p. 23. 
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the post-war Japanese economy is considered are the facts that this country has been 
placed in such a subordinate political, military and financial relationship to the 
U.S.A. that the Japanese heavy chemical industry, which is none other than war 
potential in itself, has grown with the specific intention ofletting Japan carry out the 
mission of a supply base for extensive areas in the Far East as well as in South-
East Asia l '), and that every effort has been fut into upholding war industries with 
the primary aim of producing war materials consistently since the end of the war. 
In this way the war industries of Japan came to operate again without her own 
accord in the form of the "off-shore procurement demand" from the American 
Forces arising out of the needs of the Korean War. For these specific reasons Japan-
ese war industries were obliged to develop not as self-sustaining economic activities 
to assure her own independent peace of her own accord but more or less as something 
characterised by the nature of sub-contracted activities which were forced to be 
activated. Even in those days when the equipment for the Japanese Self Defense 
Force had to be domestically manufactured, the situation remained the same. 
The Japanese troops-the Self Defense Force-were placed under American com-
so as to constitute a part of one great united army composed of many other foreign 
mand, armies of the anti-communist countries in the Far East, and all kinds of arms 
for this great army are inevitably limited to those of standard gauges. All weapons 
for the Self Defense Force at the time of its establishment were those given by the 
American Forces and it was an absolute necessity to use standard gauge weapons 
because of the relationships with the armaments of other anti-communist countries. 
Consequently, when weapons were to be domestically manufactured, it was required 
that their specifications were to be made in conformity with the American standard 
and for this reason, the domestic makers were obliged to purchase the relevant 
rights to make them, or to buy vested rights for specific designs and techniques 
involved .. ' (See an instance of an airplane referred to later.) Even when they 
were domestically made, such production in this country not but become a type of 
self-supplying system of production without her own accord, by making them in 
this country at a cheap cost of labour under the subordinated control of American 
monopoly capital. 
As can be imagined from the foregoing discussion, even if the relative weight of 
the production of war materials, of which major items were weapons, in relation 
to the production of the mining and manufacturing industries as a whole was 
small, the equipment system of the latest arms was based on the integrated whole 
of the latest and most specialised science and techniques in an extensive field of 
production, such as metal as well as machines, chemical industry, not to speak of the 
electronic industry oflate. The production of arms, which is by nature concerned 
with all fields of production and which requires the highest effectiveness and 
17) "Ten Years' History of the Defensive Production Committee", p. 77. 
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strict conformity with standard specifications, has been very helpful for the post-war 
Japanese economy in raising the level of the structure of her production and to 
facilitate her heavy chemical industrialisation, and it has played an important part 
in stimulating her national economy. No one can deny the fact that this country 
has learned a lot in the field of munition production in securing repeated technical 
training to produce arms in strict conformity with the specifications and standard 
gauges, and also in mastering not only the technical control of the production process 
the latest type, but also in the latest financial administration!8) since the period of 
Korean War, when this country had practically no weapons of the modern type 
at all. Moreover from the aspect of the direct production of arms "the facilities 
of producing projectiles which came to be provided to meet the needs of the "special 
procurement demand" did have the capacity for all sizes, ranging from rifle bullets 
to large caliber projectiles, and in addition the efficiency and precision to be 
achieved at these facilities which were operating on the mass production system 
were just as good as those in the U.S.A., and their technique of production was 
also of the highest and latest type""). It was in an effort to conform, or to be ready 
to conform, with the military production system that "scientific control" and 
"labour administration" have come to be extensively adopted in this country after 
the end of the war. 
II 
The pre-war Japanese heavy chemical industry used to develop primarily in 
line with military demand, and this causative relationship still holds true even 
after the post-war period. In other words, basic production power which is none 
other than war potential has consistently been kept reinforced primarily in the 
field of the heavy chemical industry, so that post-war Japanese heavy industry could 
meet the needs of the American off-shore procurement demand as pointed out 
before, could cope with the rearmament scheme of this country and could supply 
a variety of arms to anti-communist countries in Asia only to achieve the mission 
of being "the arsenal of Asia". Table 3 shows that heavy chemical industrialisation 
has been making rapid progress since the end of the war. It is true that the 
component ratio of the heavy chemical industry is found to decrease temporarily 
immediately after the war, (in fact 46.3% in 1950), but this decrease can well be 
be accounted a result of the restored production activity of all kinds of consumer 
goods which used to be extremely pressed and restricted by the war, and it is seen 
that the component ratio came to restore the ratio of over 50% from 1951. 
Needless to say, the background of this increased component ratio of the heavy 
1 B) The Problems of the Japanese Industrial Structure, last volume, p. 290. 
19) National Defense Yearbook, 1960, p. 99, 
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Table 3. 
Year 
1940 
1947 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1955 
1956 
1957 
M. KIHARA 
Component Ratio of the Heavy Chemical Industry in Relation to 
Manufacturing Industry 
Component Ratio Year Component Ratio 
71.6% 1958 60.2% 
57.0~~ 1959 62.5% 
46.3% 1960 64.8% 
51.2~/~ 1961 66.6% 
51.4% 1962 63.9% 
53.5% 1963 61.6% 
54.4% 1964 63.8~,~ 
56.8%) 1965 62.6% 
60. 7~~ 
Figures up to 1953 are the calculated results of Industrial Statistics, while those after 1955 are 
taken from News Report of Manufacturing Industr..v Statistics, 1965J p. 14. Both are figures based 
on the amount of added values. 
chemical industry is "the special procurement demand" arising out of the needs 
of the Korean War, that broke out in June 1950. 
However, the nature of the original "special procurement demand" was 
gradually changed into a different order primarily concerned with completed arms, 
availing itself of the opportunity of the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
in 1951. Then the "Act of Arms Manufacturing" was promulgated for the 
purpose of resuming the production of completed arms'O) to cope with the national 
situation and simultaneously the Anti-Trust Law came to be drastically revised. 
As a result of such changes in the nature of the demand the relative weight of the 
heavy chemical industry was consistently kept increasing, both in the absolute and 
relative sense of the word, from 1953. In other words, the switch over to a new 
type of "special procurement demand", the content of which was concerned with 
steel works and motor cars, from the original "special procurement for Korea" 
which was characterised by repair and servicing came to create more and more 
active investments for further equipment in a wider field of production and 
accumulation in a high pitched tendency came to be practised in a more and 
more active way. In this connection what should be noted is the fact that the 
reopening of arms production played an important part in reconstructing the 
20) The Anti-Trust Law underwent a drastic revision in the direction of mitigation in 1963. "As 
for the trust-control, it was primarily aimed to delete the provisions to exclude the difference of 
the unjustified enterprising capability (CJause R) and a drastic mitigation of the limitation pJaced 
the consolidation of enterprises (Clause 9-16). Correspondingly the effectiveness of the private 
on anti-monopoly law was secured because the provision to prevent it from happening was 
nullified," making it a completely mutilated control as a result. 
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machine industry which was suffering badly because of the large-scale facilities 
forced to be kept out of operation throughout the post-war period"). 
Monopoly capital, emphasising the necessity of new fixed investments and the 
urgent need to renew their equipment, "submitted their request to the Government 
to get national support for their required funds to meet the need of reopening arms 
production""). This eloquently illustrates the fact that heavy chemical industry, 
which was primarily supported by monopoly capital, did have an inseparable 
relationship with the militarisation of the national economy and, moreover, that 
the so-called "rapid growth" originating from 1955, of which the main factor was 
composed of investments for equipment and facilities, was stimulated and hastened, 
being backed up by the war industries. Needless to say, the needed funds were 
managed to be appropriated through inflated loans on credit from the Bank of 
Japan, taking advantage of the low cost of labour. 
In this way the year 1953 became the starting point for the establishment of 
a new sytematic structure for the war industries on the basis of the newly arising 
"special prccurement demand", chiefly to supply completed arms, and in March 
of the following year, 1954, the M.S.A. Agreement came to be signed, when 
"economic cooperation between the U.S.A. and this country" marked a new stage. 
The period 1954-55 happened to become "the period in which an extreme interest 
was taken"") by monopoly capitalists-"death merchants". Putting it another 
way, during this period a variety of definite activities came to be motivated in a 
great number of fields, such as the production of jet-planes, construction of guard-
ships, the decision of a distribution plan of funds coming from released wheat 
through the M.S.A., which became one of the good chances for the domestic 
production of all kinds of equipment of the latest type, the starting of a G M round-
table conference as represented by a civilian research agent for the study of missiles 
and what not"24). The particular move which we (monopoly capitalists) can not 
overlook is that the first term national defense programme which had been in 
the planning stage in secret since the establishment of the National Safety Force 
(a 5-year plan covering the period 1956-60) was tentatively approved, though 
unofficially, in the fiscal year 1955. "25) 
In this way, taking advantage of the assistance accepted from the M.S.A. for 
one thing and simultaneously the reopening of production of completed weapons 
for another, the contemplated national defense plan to reform the structure of 
defense production to back up Japanese military power (the Self Defense Force) 
plunged into a new stage and for this reason the rearmament plan under the mask 
of the first term national defense programme came to be approved in secret. 
21) Th, Probl,ms of th, japan,s, /nduJtrial Structure, last volume, p. 229. 
22) "Ten Ten Years' History of the Defensive Production Committee", p. 55. 
23),24),25) Ibid., p. 14. 
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Table 4 (A). Changes in Military Expenditure 
1950 
IMarch: MSA/effectuated 
!~ 
!.July: Self Defense Forcejesta-
'blished 
1951 1952 1953'1954119551 1956 
, 1 
----~,---.----~-------~. ------------i-----,-----,---' 
! A Total Annual Expenditure 
Annual Rate of Increase 
'B Military Expenditure 
Annual Rate of Increase 
633,2591 
, 
13,202[ 
1 
749,8381 
18.4 
21,4001 
62.1 
873,942i 1,040,761! 1,040,761! 1,018,16911,069,204 
1 I 
16.6 26.7 -2.3 -2.2 i 5.0 
104,116i 157,3361 154,6991 I 35,968! 134,492 
487.5 51.1! -1.7 -2.2 -1.1 
C 
iD 
E 
F 
X 
B/A 2.0 2.9 11.9 15.5 14.9 13.4 12.6 
Sub-Total of Military 
Total Annual Expenditure 1,027,250 999,87911,013,3141 1,089,652 
Annual Rate of Increase 
Defense Expenditure 
Annual Rate of Increase 
Pension of Military Per-
sonnel 
Maintenance/Repair of 
Roads, Harbours, Air· 
fields, etc. 
D+E+F 
Annual Rate of Increase 
D/C 
X/C 
Rate of Heavy Chemical 
Industrialisation 
153,110 
1 
49,999, 
14.9 
1 1.3' 
147,7651 132,765 1 
1 
-10.2 I 1 
68,an 
I 
68,7 101 
1 
31,5751 
I 
233,0501 
I 
14.8 13.1 
23.0 
54.4 
A and B are taken from Major Economic Statistics. C, D and E from Financial Statistics, and the rate 
of heavy chemical industrialisation from News Report of Manufacturing Industry Statistics. 
Besides, the inherent nature of war industries is such that once they start to operate, 
they can not survive without a definite military plan, because war industries must 
make headway with a far-sighted long range plan which will be discussed later. 
The national defense conference should indisputably be held for the explicit purpose 
of determining a basic policy of national defense, to prepare an outline of the 
military plan and to control industry in conformity with the military plan (see 
Clause 42 of the Act of Establishing the National Defense Force). 
2.5 
140,765 
6.0 
75,221 
35,840 
251,829: 
8.1 
12.9 
23.1 
56.8 
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(Unit: ¥ 1,000,000) 
Double Income Plan 
~ 1st Term National Defense Prog.--~ ~ I~ Term National Defense Programme ~ 
" 1957 1-19581",19591 19601--1961--,,-1962 1--'9631 1964 I 1965 I 1966: 
iJ87,67611:3-3~,562 -1:~95~391~743~1~812,o63,46812,556~1:f3,o44'29213,340:4931 ;,658,08°1-4::314:270 
11.0 'I' 12.1 12.3 16.6 18.4 23.9, 19.1, 9.7' 9.5 I' 
152,973, 151,476 157,138 163,4931 182,743 217,306 245,170j 182,092 302,771 340,666 
13.7 '-1.0 3.7 4.0 11.8 18.9 12.8 i 15.1 7.3: 21.5 
12.9 13.8 10.5 9.4 8.9 8.5 8.1 8.4 8.3 I 
Expenditures = 'I' 1,050,229 ... A' Sub-Total of Military Expenditure = 'I' 1,570,749 ... B' 
Rate of Increase against A' .. .49.65% 
-------~--------~ ---
Sub-Total of Military Expenditure Sub-Total of Military Expenditure 
='1'654,900 ('1'163,790 per year) % '1'1,388,000 ('1'277,600 per year) 
1,184,613! 1,333,0831 1,512,095 1,765,1631 2,107,382, 2,563,091 3,506,807! 3,340,498 1 3,744,498' 4,314,270 
'I ! I 
8,7 
i 
12.5 , 13.4 16.7 19.4 21.6 19.3 1 9.3 , 12.1 15.2 , 
, 
, 
, 
141, 165 i 146,165: 153,318 157,662: 180,924' 210,976' 247,5SD: 280,775' 305,297 340,660 
0.2 , 3.5 4.9 2.8 14.8 16.6 , 
, 
17.3 13.4 8.8 11.5 
76,159, 92,554 94,528 112,754 114,635 113,221' 116,969, 139,454' 148,756 167,936 
59,579 67,698 102,378 109,826 164,150 209,377! 165,080; 319,807' 358,930 425,063 
, 
276,934, 306,417 350,224 380,242: 459,709 533,574: 629,599 740,036 813,083 933,665 
10.0 10.6 14.3 8.6 20.9 16.1 18.0 17.5 9.9 14.8 
11.9 11.0 10.1 8.9 8.6 8.2 8.1 8.4 8.2 7.9 
23.4 23.0 23.2 21.5 21.8 20.8 20.6 22.2 12.7 21.6 
60.0 60.2 62.5 64.8 66.0 63.9 61.6 63.8 62.6 
I i ! 
,-' --------------------- ---~---" ----------,----_ ... ---' ---------~ 
------------- -- --- ------.. -------...... ------------ _ .. ,-- -----------------
See Table 4 (B). 
It was through the distribution of the counter-funds of released wheat corning 
from the M.S.A. that "the historical role was played" to establish and reinforce 
the munition production system'S) and "the reorganisation of enterprises under 
26) Ibid" p. 75. On the basis of the "Agreement between Japan and the U.S.A. with respect to 
the Purchase of Agricultural Products" which is one of four agreements under the Mutual Security 
Act, it was so agreed that Japan shall buy surplus American wheat in yen and 20% of this amount 
in yen shaH be given to Japan by America and the remaining 80% is to be paid for the off-shore 
procurement by America. In this way wheat imported as a foodstuff was converted into war 
potential by the M.S.A. Agreements. 
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Table 4 (B). Index Number based on the National Defense Programme 
'I' Commencing Year Completing Year: 
Percentage against 
I 100 100 I-A~-;'ual Revenue -----------i, --3-2-3-.-6-0/-'0 -=(-'1-95-,,-· --6-5-)-+----4-2"-5:..8:.0-Yo----1 
I-D.~_·~_en_s.;~E_x_~_-e,.n~d-"it~r~-----~i __ 2_3_3_.I_'X_o_(i_9_5_.~~_6_5_) __ 1 -2~6~~--_- -[ 
Expenditure for Pension of I 18 9 65) 1 
Military Personnel ,.1 % (I 55- . _2~~.~~ _____ _ 
_ 1~n~~~~~;e~~Z~a~~';fe~~~;trc~,~~627.9% (1955-65)- -_. - 1,346.2% .. _1 
1 _______ X ________ . ____ ~0~~7'X_o_(l955~65) 400.6%._1 
Expenses for Social Security, etc. 478.2% (1955-65)_6~~~'Yo -- _____ I 
Education, Assistance for ----------- ---------
Scientific Development, etc. 319.1 % (1955-65) 455.0% I 
strict administrative control, and thus a rationalising scheme" were driven forward 
with emphasis by monopoly capital27). One of the reasons was because the metal, 
all other raw materials, component parts, equipment-all had to be of the highest 
quality, since arms had to be made with maximum effectiveness. The other 
reason was because the reinforcement and improvement of all related industries 
were urgently needed on priority and it was essential that production channels 
should be strengthened and that the technical and financial control over sub-
contractors should be improved, under which circumstances the labour engaged in 
the production process was obliged to be reinforced. For these reasons it was 
as early as 1954 that "many enterprises were already in readiness for the mass 
production (of arms)"). 
The component ratio of heavy chemical industry after the war is found to show 
some differences even after 1953. This is because the ratio is calculated on the 
basis of added values, on which good or bad business conditions immmediately reo 
fleeted their effects. In other words, "if compared with the ratio of the amount of 
added values in the preceeding year, heavy chemical industry shows a greater 
tendency of growth during the prosperous period and a smaller tendency during 
the business depression period""). For instance, in each of the years 1958 and 
1962, both of which are well·known as business depressions, the ratio of heavy 
chemical industrialisation is found to decrease. This indicates that heavy chemical 
industry which kept expanding on the basis of war production is likely "to be 
governed by the state of good or bad business"30). 
27) Ibid., p. 65. 
28) National Dq/ense Yearbook, 1955 ed., p. 482. 
29) News Report of Manufacturing Industry Statistics, 1965 ed., p. 14. 
30) Ibid., p. 14. 
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During the period covering 1955-1960 the component ratio of heavy chemical 
industry made further growth and came to exceed 60%. The group of heavy 
chemical industries made such a rapid growth as this, but among this group the 
following four specialised industries concerned with machinery have made particu-
larly prominent advances and each relative weight (due to the amount of delivered 
products) of those four industries in relation to heavy chemical industry as a whole 
may be summarised as follows: 
Machine Electric Equipment Transport Equip- Precision Machine 
Making Making ment Making Making 
1955 4.7% 4.3% 6.6% 0.8% 
1960 8.0% 9.5Cj~ 9.9% I'} ~~ 
1964 8.4% 9.5% 10.0% 1.2% 
As shown here the machine making industry which has been most closely related 
with the production of arms shows a consistent increase in its relative weight. 
Consequently, the machine indmtry played a most important role not only for the 
so-called "high pitched growth" after 1955 but also for heavy chemical industriali-
sation. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the development thus achieved 
cannot always be characterised merely by such a rosy content as to say that "the 
course of growth primarily led by the machine industry came to be accelerated by 
a rising movement of spiral type which went through processes such as the increase 
of the demand for labour power, which in turn caused an increase in the purchases 
of consumption goods as a result of the increased wages, thus resulting in the 
further expansion of the machine industry."3l) Without taking into due considera-
tion the part played by munition production which was made possible through 
the medium of "technical innovation", the economic development of this country 
after the war would never be properly grasped. 
As a result of the recent improvements of airplanes and other arms of the 
latest type the scope of war industries began to be increasingly widened, their 
relationships with other ordinary civilian industry came to be more and more 
closely connected and it is now no longer possible to make a clear distinction 
between the two types of industry. Above all the aircraft industry, one of the most 
important war industries which is based on the latest and most advanced techniques 
has the closest relationship with all other kinds of industries. Consequently, 
the problem of war industries as well as that of the militarisation of the Japanese 
economy can no longer be understood only from the standpoint of determining 
the relative amount of the production of arms which are no more than expendables 
necessitating no more production or merely from the aspect of the relative 
31) Today's Japanese Capitalism, Vol. 1, p. 26. 
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weight of profit commg from the production of arms in relation to the related 
monopolistic enterprises""). It is impossible to analyse the role played by war 
industries and its effect upon the Japanese economy after the war merely by 
quantitative comparison. War' industries backed up by military power (the Self 
Defense Force) "will not suffice to maintain their supply capacity in sufficient 
readiness to replenish consumption only for the use of training during peacetime. "33) 
"In order to be able to maintain at all times the needed scale which might be 
required in time of emergency"") monopoly capital did confirm in 1955 "that the 
establishing of such a production structure on the scale needed to insure possible 
supplies for procurement in time of emergency should be taken up as a national 
question. "") The rapid increase of the total amount of investments for tangible 
Table 5. Total Amount of Investments for Tangible Fixed Properties in 
Manufacturing Industry 
(Unit: ¥ 1,000,000) 
Fiscal Year Actual Amount Index of Increase (1955= 100) 
1955 256,219 100.0 
1956 436,419 155.4 
1957 701,940 274.0 
1958 599,334 233.9 
1959 698,086 272.5 
1960 1,232,022 380.8 
1961 1,655,364 646.1 
1962 11,750,743 683.3 
1963 1,618.190 631.3 
1964 1,913,555 746.8 
News Report of Manufacturing Industry Statistics, 1964 ed., p. 17. 
fixed properties in the field of manufacturing industry after 1955 as shown in 
Table 4 proves that such a question is consistently being materialised. Putting it 
an other way, the total amount of investments for tangible fixed properties, taking 
1955 to be 100, made an extreme increase as great as almost 5 times in the course 
of 5 years in 1960 and 7.5 times in 1964. The fact that manufacturing industries 
as a whole in which such a rapid increase of investment for fixed properties 
was made-among them the heavy chemical industry, particularly the machine 
industry-played the leading role was the background of "a driving force of 
32) Revivin,if Japanese Militarism, p. 26.1. 
33L 34). 35) "Present Position of the Defensive Industry and the Problems for This Fiscal Year", 
Ivlonlhly Report of the Federation of Economic Organisations, Vol. 3, No.2, 1955, p. 51. 
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the national economy"36) eloquently proves that the needed production capacity 
that may be able to supply the required war materials in time of emergency has 
already been developed in readiness. 
The equipment of arms of the latest type is to be made up of the latest techniques 
and sciences of the highest level. From the aspects of the nature of the latest arms 
the aim of their production it is essential that production facilities should be 
exclusively used for this purpose only, that the method, scale and quantity of 
production should be pre-determined and planned, and that both administration 
and technique should be placed under a consistently concentrated control. In 
this way the war industries of the present day are to be built up with planning at 
the highest level. Consequently, since today's munition production is so closely 
related with the other fields of production, it is inevitable that all fields of production 
should be placed on a military footing. Because of the necessity of planning at 
the highest level from the aspect of the national economy as a whole, the relation-
ship between the military budget and war industries becomes more and more 
inseparable through the instrumentality of military planning (the national defense 
plan)-troops (the Self Defense Force). The policy of heavy chemical indus-
trialisation in this country has been carried out with careful planning in the post-war 
period, with emphasis on the production of war materials under the subordination 
of American imperialism. It was primarily because the annual budget was kept 
consistently expanding in a very rapid and greatly increasing tendency from year 
to year and because heavy chemical industry was kept constantly progressing with 
great strides that the total war potential of the Self Defense Force "has grown to 
be one of the most powerful troops in all liberalist countries in Asia-in fact being 
ranked 7th in the world"37) as a result of the materialisation of the 2nd term 
national defense programme (1962-1966). In short, the total sum added together 
of military expenditure involved in the first term national defense programme 
(1958-1961) comes up to ¥654,900 million, while that involved in the second 
term programme comes up to ¥1,388,000 million (¥277,600 million per year), 
which shows an increase more than twice as large, or an annual increase of roughly 
70%. The relative weight of pure military expenditure in relation to budgetary 
annual expenditure shows a rate a little less than 10%, but when semi-military 
expenditure, such as expenses for pensions for former military personnel and repairj 
maintenance expenses for roads, harbours, airfields, etc. are included, it comes up to 
over 20%, which shows the predominance of a military colour. It is widely known 
that "the Mitsuya Study" was pursued to determine the concrete content of the 
second term national defense programme, and this fact in itself furnishes good 
proof that the economic and military foundations which were to be pre-determined 
36) News Report of Manufacturing Industry Slatistics, 1964 ed., p. 14. 
37) Chuichi Fukase, "Defensive System I: Self Defense Force", Jurist, p. 41. 
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as prerequisites of a military nation by "the Mitsuya Study" are now being enforced, 
and making are steady progress. 
The aims of the third term national defense programme, which came to be 
contemplated from the end of 1962 and which was put in to operation from 1967, 
are concentrated on (I) improvement of defensive power for the surrounding seas 
in the Far East, (2) reinforcement of guided missile (nuclear-equipped) units and 
(3) a complete domestic manufacturing scheme for all kinds of military equipment 
with emphasis on the development and production of military planes (F-X fighters) 
for the fiscal year to come. The third term national defense programme, therefore, 
under the new circumstance of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security be-
tween Japan and the U.S.A. to be renewed in the near future, is the most likely to 
bring forth the danger of placing another milestone on the road to becoming a 
subordinated military nation, since this national project is now being materialised 
to combine the military forces (the Self Defense Force) and the major group of 
monopoly capital in closer and closer relationships, with emphasis placed on the 
domestic manufacture of military equipment, driving the military scheme forward 
not only in the economic field but also in the fields of politics and free thought, and 
making every effort to establish "the production system of military materials". 
The adoption of offensive weapons, such as guided missiles and fighter-planes, would 
tend to make the nature of the Self Defense Force more and more aggressive, and 
the domestic manufacturing scheme for all kinds of arms would inevitably produced 
a very fair possibility of giving rise to an export industry for completed arms, 
resulting in giving the nation a background of a reinforced military and economic 
aggressiveness. 
The adoption of weapons of an offensive nature and the domestic manufacturing 
scheme would conversely in turn prescribe the scale of the military structure in 
itself to a great extent, and the result would be accompanied by an accelerating 
increase of military expenditure, all of which facts would find their way in the form 
not only of the militarisation of the various fields covering politics, free thought and 
education, but also of a straightforward revival of militarism. 
III 
The development of the Japanese economy after the war can by no means be 
properly understood without taking the revival of war industries in this country 
into due consideration. To begin with, the fact that the American policy toward 
Japan of making her "a factory in the East" as "a defensive wall against com-
munism" was adopted in January 1948 formed a precondition for disregarding 
Clause 9 of the Constitution of Japan which prohibits her to rearm. Later the 
evacuation of reparation items came to be eased and at the same time potential 
production power for munitions was deliberately preserved. It is reported that 
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as much as 72% of the facilities and factories which happened to have been 
rescued from destruction on account of the discontinuance of evacuation of 
reparation items used to have direct engagement in the production of weapons, 
and as much as 80-90% of their former production capacity was still reserved at 
the time of the Korean War (1951)36). The same was ture with human resources. 
But, now, let us turn to the case of the aircraft industry which comprised one of 
the most important war industries. In the case of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
immediately after the end of the war, "all of their aircraft specialists were gathered 
together at their two main factories located at Matsumoto in Shinshu for the 
purpose of keeping them in safety and the present President, Kono, of this company 
was then the Chief of one of these two main factories and two other directors 
at present (Moriya and Kubo) were also among that group of specialists""). 
And then this group of specialists was split up to operate three brother industries 
making ships and automobiles called "East", "Middle" and "West" Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries respectively, and it was these elite specialists who made every 
effort to assemble a technical staff of as many as 700 airplane designing specialists 
for this company at present since the reopening of arms production in 1952-3, 
irresolute as they were at the very beginning because of no knowing of any definite 
prospect in the future development of airplane-making then"40). It was only 
because the physical as well as human resources had been deliverately preserved 
in this way that munition production could be reopened without delay to meet 
the needs of the "special procurement demand for Korea" starting in 1950. 
The period covering 1945-1949 after the war was roughly characterised by 
low wages, the cheap price of rice and unprecedentedly heavy taxes on the people 
at large, during which period working funds were primarily concentrated by 
monopoly capitalists under circumstances such as the inflation policy mainly in line 
with the interests of the monopoly capitalists, financial subsidies and rehabilita-
tion loans for the purpose of redistribution of the national income. In this way 
the production conditions which had been completely smashed by the war came 
to be rehabilitated. 
Monopoly capital enforced the accumulation of its capital through the structure 
of national monpoly capitalism, taking advantage of the impetus that had arisen 
from the "special procurement demand for Korea". In other words, assistance 
was given from national finances to monopoly capital in the form of subsidies 
through a national budget mechanism to accumulate capital, i.e. the re-evaluation 
of properties, special measures for depreciation, financial loans, etc., and thus the 
basic production powers such as iron and steel, shipbuilding, machinery, coal, 
38) Ryozo Takahashi~ "The Entire Picture of Planning of 'The Defensive Production'''~ Central 
Review, April 1953, pp. 77-78. 
39) Diamond. December 1966, p. 56. 
40) Ibid., p. 56. 
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petroleum, etc., were reinforced. In this way the fundamental requirements for 
war industries came to be materialised. Thus the production of completed 
weapons activated by the new "special procurment demand" and the ever "ac-
celerating accumulation" through M.S.A. assistance" were facilitated and in 1955 
Japanese monopoly capitalism came to be firmly established through dependency 
on and subordination to American imperialism, which provided this country 
with a foundation for reviving a new militarism and imperialism. 
During the period covering 1956-1960 the policy of high pitched accumulation 
called "rapid growth" was further enforced and a substantial system of monopoly 
capital has come to make rapid developments to its full scale on the background of 
heavy chemical industry under reinforced financial subordination through the 
mechanism of national monopoly capitalism, such as an instrumentality of expanded 
loans (created by the Bank of Japan), taking advantage of the low cost of wages. 
Arms have come to be no more than an important item of an export industry, the 
Safety Force or Self Defense Force has now grown into an army and navy in the 
true sense of the word and the intention of overseas expansion has come to be carried 
out in a more and more straightforward manner. 
In 1960 the Japanese subordinate relationship to the U.S.A. was reorganised on 
the basis of the development and reinforcement of Japanese monopoly capital, 
resulting in the conclusion of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan 
and the U.S.A., which is none other than a military alliance. By this new Treaty 
Japan has been obliged 50 be incorporated in American nuclear strategy and as a 
result Japanese war potential has had to be reorganised accordingly. Simultane-
ously the know-how for the modernisation of Self Defense Force equipment and 
the domestic manufacturing scheme for it have been driven forward while the 
production of war materials has also leapt forward a stage to make substantial 
progress. Besides, monopoly capital, after overcoming its engineering and technical 
backwardness, is now attempting to find its way into overseas competition, coping 
with waves of international "Iiberalisation". It must be said that the increase of 
military expenditure, as already pointed out, and the issuance of government 
bonds from 1966 in themselves explicilly illustrate such an intention of monopoly 
capital as to tracing the road to militarism. "The new policy of doubling individual 
income" which began to be adopted after 1961 is no more than a national monopoly 
capitalistic "scheme". 
Nevertheless, Japanese monopoly capitalism came to face its own contradictions 
less than several years directly after its enforcement, and has been driven into a 
resultant crisis. Monopoly capital is now attempting, in the hope of solving this 
contradiction, to carry out its militarisation scheme not only in all the domestic 
fields of economy, politics, free thought, culture and what not, but also in the 
form of aggressive expansion overseas. For this purpose the heavy chemical 
industrialisation of the national economy is a mandatory and supreme order, which 
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IS typically revealed in the recent conspIcuoUS inroads in to South-East Asian 
countries attempted by this country. It is, therefore, of primary importance for us 
to have a correct understanding of the exact part to be played by the heavy chemical 
industrialised Japanese economy created by Japanese monopoly capital and 
American imperialism, and we must also take full recognition of the fact that the 
Japanese economy is now stepping through a most momentous stage. 
